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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Ces Provinces sont si puissantes & si riches, elles sont si bien situées, ses habitans 
sont si industrieux, si vaillans, si fidelles à leur Prince, que si la France, ou la 
Grande-Bretagne, ou les Provinces-Unies en étoient en possession; il n'y auroit 
plus d'Equilibre de Pouvoir en Europe. La France doit donc renoncer pour jamais 
à l'espérance de cette Conquête. 
Rousset de Missy, Les intérêts présens des puissances de l’Europe (17332) 
 
A. UTRECHT AND THE NEW HORIZONTAL ORDER 
The geostrategic position of the Southern Netherlands has been a hotly debated topic in both 
older and modern historiography, up to the point where it has become a commonplace to refer 
to the “pistol on the heart of England3” or to the “barrier4” between France and Holland.  After 
the Peace of Utrecht 5,  the Netherlands went over to the Austrian Habsburg Emperor Charles VI. 
His possessions seemed however to have become strategically “landlocked” between the 
conflicting geopolitical ambitions of Great Britain6, The Dutch Republic7, France8 and the German 
princes9. All of their contradicting long term aspirations were mutually exclusive. Consequently,  
their realization became utterly utopian and the object of their desires nothing but a shared 
neutral zone. 
Throughout the seventeenth century, France had battled to regain the initiative in the North, to 
the detriment of the declining Spanish Empire (1635-165910). Once this was accomplished, Louis 
XIV invaded the Dutch Republic (1672), causing the Regents to balance his ascendancy by 
pooling forces together with the waning Spanish Netherlands. British intervention during the 
Nine Years war (1688-1697) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1713) brought the 
imposition of a third-party sovereign: Emperor Charles VI, linked to his new possessions by 
dynastic rather than geostrategic considerations11. A protecting trilateral barrier fortress regime 
on several strategic towns was arranged by the three “victorious” allies Habsburg, Britain and 
Holland (1715 Treaty of Antwerp). France could now be contained. 
However, the ensuing peaceful “trente heureuses” (1713-174312) saw structural change in the 
international environment. Utrecht did not amount to a mere territorial consolidation against an 
aggressive would-be hegemon, but installed a system whereby France and Britain jointly 
managed to uphold a horizontal and stable international order13. Unilateral claims and 
aspirations did not stand a chance against coupled intervention in the system of “Stanhope and 
Dubois14” (1715-1721), followed by that of “Walpole and Fleury” (1726-1742)15.  
The new diplomatic system had profound consequences for British policy. Contrary to the myth 
of a “second hundred years war16” stretching from 1688 (Glorious Revolution) to 1815 (Battle of 
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Waterloo), Britain had no serious issues with France for almost three decades17. This article 
aims to demonstrate how the position of the Southern Netherlands was affected by the new 
configuration and how this expressed itself in the ideas uttered by political practitioners. 
B. EUROPE THUNDERSTRUCK: THE 1725 RIPPERDA TREATY  
The text18 I treat as a case-study for this changed British attitude towards the Southern 
Netherlands, is a handwritten letter by Charles Townshend (1674-1738), secretary of State for 
the Northern Department, to Horace Walpole (1678-1757) 19, ambassador of George I20 in Paris, 
dated 16 (Old Style)/27 August  (New Style) 1725. The dispatch is to be situated in a year of high 
international tension or even “cold war”21, with the (first) Treaty of Vienna of May 1725 
potentially leading to a new European-wide war of the importance of the above mentioned 
conflicts. 
By the Treaty of Vienna, Emperor Charles VI (1685-174022) and Philip V (1683-174623) of Spain 
decided to end the legal quarrel that had been dividing them for twenty-five years: Charles VI 
abandoned his claims to Spain, whereas Philip V relinquished his pretentions to the Austrian 
territories in Italy24. Relations of enmity transformed into a full-fledged defensive and offensive 
alliance, oiled by Spanish subsidies. In addition, Charles obtained commercial privileges in the 
Spanish colonies for his Imperial Trading Company at Ostend25.  
Two camps built up in the aftermath of the Ripperda Treaty (named after the Dutch adventurer 
Johan Willem van Ripperda (1680-1737), who negotiated the whole undertaking in Vienna). On 
the one hand, a coalition of the dissatisfied, consisting of Spain, the Emperor and Tsarina 
Catherine of Russia. On the other, George I and Louis XV of France26, who defended the Utrecht 
settlement as it had been confirmed in the treaty of the Quadruple alliance.  
This combination was quite novel. During Louis XIV’ wars, it had been the tradition to pool the 
forces of (threatened) Habsburg with the Maritime Powers (Holland – Britain27). This “old 
system”28 functioned on the basis of two conflicting premises: the Emperor occupied 
considerable territory, but, by contrast, had strenuous “sinews of war”29, alimented by Britain 
and Holland. Taken in isolation, the Habsburg Monarchy was not able to dominate Europe.  In a 
coalition, it depended on the Maritime Powers. 
However, towards the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, Austria gained in strength, up to 
a point where Britain deserted its cause (and that of the Dutch Republic30) to arrange a separate 
peace with France (Preliminaries of London, October 1711). Louis XIV’ grandson, Philip of Anjou, 
was left in place as King of Spain, even though it had been the initial goal of the 1701 “Grand 
Alliance” against France to displace him. However, if this outcome unsettled the new Emperor 
Charles VI (1711), it was not satisfying to Philip V either. Both monarchs were deemed to be 
each other’s main competitor in the aftermath of Utrecht. This was most evident in Italy, where 
Philip V had to abandon the Aragonese heritage of Ferdinand II the Catholic (1479-1516) and 
the ensuing enlargement by Charles V and Philip II. Austria installed itself in a new power 
position, able to dominate Italy31. 
Philip’s invasion of Italy in 1717-1718 was the clearest illustration of the latter antagonism.  
Franco-British intervention, siding with the Emperor (Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, 1718), 
imposed a mediated solution to Spanish-Austrian rivalry in the peninsula. The ensuing Congress 
of Cambrai (1722-1725) stranded in mistrust between the players32. 
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The result of the Ripperda alliance, namely Austrian territorial ascendance, reinforced by an 
enlarged taxable basis of commercial prosperity, created a strong geopolitical challenge to the 
Franco-British duopoly. Moreover, the Spanish court did its utmost best to obtain a mixed 
marriage between either of the Spanish princes and either of the Austrian archduchesses, 
heiresses to Charles VI’ throne. In the Spanish interpretation, the infant Carlos (1716-1788) was 
to marry the archduchess Maria Theresia and thus become the heir to the Emperor. In reaction 
to this potential reversal of European order, France and Britain used the summer to assemble a 
league of Northern sovereigns and German princes at Hannover, where George I made his 
annual peregrinatio33.  
For the Southern Netherlands, the unashamed reversal of the ‘ancien système’ created an entirely 
different game. Until 1714, the lines of defense were oriented against France. However, with the 
supposed support of the Maritime Powers, France was now encircling a vulnerable Habsburg 
possession (North-West-South). Consequently, since the diplomatic roadmap had changed, 
British military policy had to change as well, to adapt to a new geopolitical vision. 
My approach will be source-based, as the letter from Townshend to Walpole has not yet been 
thoroughly analyzed in old and new historiography34, but rather used as an example of an 
unrealized scheme. I formulate the hypothesis that this letter actually contained more than an 
individual escapade from a prominent “aggressive” Whig-minister. It incorporated necessary 
strategic changes to the main narrative of British foreign policy towards the European continent 
and was more representative of values within the diplomatic community than a brief treatment 
would suggest.  
I will proceed in an analytical way, briefly situating authors and personal context, to proceed to 
the actual narrative and its possible explanations. In a second move, I will broaden the spectrum 
to  general European politics in the 1710s, 1720s and 1730s. 
II. A CONVERSATION BETWEEN TWO “MEN IN OFFICE” 
 
Dear Horace […], I shall open my mind to you fully & freely without any Reserve, upon a point of such 
importance, that in my opinion, our freeing ourselves from our present difficulties as well as from 
many things that may happen hereafter will entirely depend upon our well or ill regulating this 
single article, and as you must agree with me, the present posture of the King’s affaires abroad, & the 
crisis they are now at, require the utmost application & attention from those his Maj[es]ty is pleased 
to employ. 
 
The conversation between Townshend and Walpole is one between two monuments of British 
18th Century foreign policy. Its circulation is extremely restricted (‘Very private’), since the 
scheme proposed by Townshend is only in a nascent form. It comes forward as a combination of 
short-term political conjuncture and long-term geostrategic structure.  
Horace Walpole, brother to ‘Britain’s First Prime Minister’ Robert (1676-1745)35, is only to share 
this information with him and the Duke of Newcastle, Secretary of State for the Southern 
Department, who stayed in London while Townshend accompanied George to Hannover36. 
Horace Walpole is often portrayed as his brother’s “walking treaty dictionary”. During Robert’s 
ministry (1721-1742), he occupied the prominent posts in Paris (1723-1730) and The Hague 
(1722, 1734-1740). During his stay in France, he succeeded in cultivating an excellent 
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relationship with French decision makers, foremost with the future prime minister, Cardinal 
Fleury (1653-1743)37. Consequently, he was the essential go-between for all European schemes 
arranged between the two powers. Not an ordinary ambassador, but more of a Secretary of State 
on a permanent mission38.  
The explicit mentioning of Newcastle is not a coincidence, as Townshend was the more bellicose 
of the two ministers for Foreign Affairs39 and known for his visceral opposition to the Emperor40. 
If he wanted his scheme to succeed, his colleague, with whom Horace Walpole had a substantial 
correspondence in view of his French embassy, had to be kept out of the affair as long as 
possible.  
In his answer41 to the letter, Horace Walpole avoids going too strongly against Townshend’s 
reasoning, and refers to the difficulties linked with its application. This is not merely a form of 
politeness, but essentially an interpretative guideline: this conversation between diplomats takes 
place within a prevailing, internationally shared, professional discourse, which operates as a 
vector for shared values within a determined field of action. Since 1713, balance of power, 
multilateral intervention and mediation occupy the scene, rather than military action or 
coalition building.  
Consequently, rather than concentrating on the effects of what they are writing (e.g. an actual 
partition following these lines was never effectuated, due to arguments further cited in Horace 
Walpole’s letter), as a traditional political historian should have done, our attention should focus 
on the framework used to deal with potentially incendiary political issues.  
Townshend’s partition plan is that of an iconoclast. It places itself in rupture with ongoing 
British policy. Walpole answer seems to be diametrically opposite. However, the analytical 
framework proposed by Townshend (A – Bilateral/Internal Issues  B – multilateral 
embedding) is applied by his counterpart as well. Both men’s assessment of context and short 
term priorities do differ,  but their objectives and normative hierarchy, inspired by the 1713 
multilateral framework, are parallel. 
III. THE PARTITION OF THE SOUTHERN NETHERLANDS: THE LOW COUNTRIES INTO OUR 
OWN HANDS 
A. THE BRINGING IN AND OUT OF A THIRD PARTY 
Townshend starts his reasoning with a reference to James Stanhope (1673-1721), the deceased 
architect of the European peace system of the Quadruple Alliance. The Netherlands, in the 
disappeared statesman’s views, should be apportioned to the Duke of Lorrain (sovereign over 
territories encircled and repeatedly occupied by France). In case this would exceed the Duke’s 
financial and administrative capability, Stanhope saw a possible union with Cologne or Treves. 
The latter two ecclesiastical German electorates ought to be ‘secularised’ and the present rulers 
(princes of the church, implying their title ends with their lives and cannot pass on to their 
children, as was the case with secular princes) duly compensated. Consequently, the Duke would 
rule a buffer state stretching from the Lys to the Rhine, become a sensu lato territorial neighbour 
to the electorate of Hannover and be able to meddle seriously in both European and German 
political affairs. However, many practical and legal inconveniencies rendered this ‘solution’ 
rather fictitious: to begin with, the Imperial Diet would have to pronounce itself on the 
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recomposition  or the secularization of territories sending delegates (and even two electors in 
the college choosing the Emperor) to Regensburg42. ‘It was the vainest of imaginations to think it 
could ever be brought to bear’. 
Nevertheless,  this was not the main reason for Townshend to reject Stanhope’s chimerical idea. 
‘[…] neither can I see any reason why England & Holland should be looking out for a third prince to 
give these Dominions to, after the Experience they have had for many years, that when they are in 
weak hands, the excessive Burthen of defending them lies wholly upon those two powers, & when 
they are in hands in some degree strong enough to defend them, they are made use of against 
them43’.  
B. THE BRITISH CLAIM ON FLANDERS 
The originality of Townshend’s plan boils down to the following idea: ‘so much of these [the Low 
Countries] countrys as is absolutely necessary for their security, ought to be put into their own 
hands respectively, and so much […] should be allotted to each of those powers […, f. 108v.] that 
what remains may safely be put into the hands of France44’. In other words: the hypothesis to be 
avoided at all costs, is and remains the occupation of the Low Countries by France. However, this 
only comes into being when French domination reaches a critical point. If Britain and Holland, 
together, or with the help of a third power45, manage to separately control and isolate the choke 
points, a minimal French presence would not be an obstacle to the stability of the situation. 
Townshend has his list ready: ‘Ipres, Newport, Ostend, Plassendahl46 & Bruges, with a territory 
annexed to them sufficient to maintain the garrisons in these places […] & to keep the fortifications 
in repair’. Ghent, however, is excluded from it:  
 
As to Ghent, its situation with respect to Trade, standing upon the Schelde, & having a Canal which 
leads to Bruges & thence to Ostend, it should in my opinion be declared a free town under the 
protection of England & the States & no other Dutys ought to be suffer’d [109r] to be imposed or laid 
on goods there, than such only as should be sufficient to support the government and magistracy of 
the town47. 
 
This looks like a new Anglo-Dutch Condominium (1706-1715), after the system that controlled 
Brabant and substantial parts of Flanders after the battle of Ramillies48. Townshend allots 
further territories to the Dutch: ‘Antwerp & Dendermonde & so much of the Country as they 
should be given49’. Finally, ’the rest’ (the Duchy of Brabant, the County of Namur, the County of 
Chiny, the Duchy of Luxemburg, the city of Tournai) falls upon ‘France & such other princes as 
may be agreed upon’. In other words, Britain and Holland claim the coastal zone and indirectly 
control administration in Ghent50. 
However, Townshend is oblivious of one crucial cultural factor: religion. In Horace Walpole’s 
words, ‘the Gentry and common people I fear are so bigoted, and so absolutely under the influence 
of the priests, that they will never sit quiet under the government of protestant powers, tho’never so 
mild and easy, and tho’ their religion and priviledges be entirely preserved to them51’. Both in the 
long (the failed union of the XVII Provinces) and the middle run (Anglo-Dutch occupation during 
the War of the Spanish Succession52), cultural issues have had a devastating effect on bringing 
two nations as diverse as the Southern Netherlands and the Dutch Republic together, making a 
‘civil government’ nearly impracticable. 
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C. THE BALANCE OF POWER REVERSED ? 
As a well versed ‘honnête homme’, Townshend includes a preliminary refutatio of his formulated 
scheme. First, ‘taking the Low Countries from the Emp[ero]r would be weakening him too much & 
consequently overturning the Balance of Power in Europe’53. An argument not at all convincing, 
since ‘the Emperor does not draw one shilling of money from those countrys, neither can he call 
away one Regiment from thence to the assistance of any other part of his Dominions54’. Even more, 
weakening Charles VI would be to the advantage of the other powers:  
 
He will then indeed have it no longer in his power to engage us in a warr, whenever he thinks fitt, 
upon terms never so unreasonable (as whilst those [f. 110r.] countrys are in his hands he really 
may) nor treat us ill, & force us into all the unreasonable measures he thinks fitt to prescribe. 
 
Consequently, the arbitrium of the Emperor to engage a European war is considerably reduced. 
The Maritime Powers ‘shall not be less in a condition […] to help him, whenever the Balance of 
Power requires it […] the Emp[ero]r, by losing these countrys, will have lost the unreasonable hold 
he has over Us, & must make it his principal aim to cultivate the friendship of the King & the States, 
because having lost the means of obliging us to do whatever he pleased […] he will be forced to 
make his court to us himself, in order to have our assistance for preserving Sicily & his dominions in 
Italy’. 
However laudable the objective and elaborated the preventive attack on criticism may be, 
Walpole sees weaknesses. Both in method and in heavy dependence on political conjuncture.  As 
of  August 1725, he interprets the Imperial threat as real, but still far from material. Sudden ill 
health with children being not uncommon at the time, either the Archduchess or Don Carlos 
could die before Charles VI himself. Moreover, the marriage had until then only been a rumor 
and in no sense a publicly announced diplomatic fact. Firmness should thus be expressed in 
negotiations, and not in confrontational threats of intervention55.  
In order to achieve the latter (bringing the Emperor to reason through talks), France, Britain and 
Holland are tied together through the system of the Triple (Holland-Britain-France, 1717) and 
Quadruple Alliances (cf. supra). If the Emperor was to effectively announce a wedding between 
his eldest daughter and Don Carlos, Townshend’s plan could be brought in as a modality of 
execution against the Emperor. But not in any way as a preventive means of action. 
To Walpole’s impression, the Balance of Power-thinking by which Townshend is guided, is a 
concept of the diplomatic community, but does not represent the confrontational and 
xenophobic public opinion56. ‘[…] the people of England and Holland must see in a [f. 123 r.] 
clearer light than I apprehend they do at present, how dangerous the Emperor’s views are like to be 
to the liberties of Europe, before they will relish a disposition which will interfere with some 
popular notions of their own, and is contrary to the maxims upon which the present possession of 
the low countries is founded, as expressed in the 2. Article of the Barrier Treaty’57. 
D. HOLLAND: THE (UN)TREATABLE ALLY ? 
Townshend has to integrate a second factor into his analysis: will the Dutch react as he suspects? 
Control of Ostend58 ‘would have startled them some time ago’. Townshend admits the point is 
sensible, but thinks the Emperor’s aggressive behavior more than tips the balance in the matter.  
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The Dutch have no alternative but to consent to a joint initiative in the Southern Netherlands. 
Under the Stanhope-hypothesis (a third party administrating the entire territory, including the 
ports and Ghent), the risk remains that the new sovereign will behave in the same way Charles 
does: making arrangements with either of the other players, and, most of all ‘endeavour from 
thence to revive & reestablish trade that once flourished to so great a degree in that country’59. 
Townshend preaches a double remedy to the commercial problem: on the one hand, the 
Republic already controls ‘the embouchure of the Schelde & all the canals of that side’. In his 
scheme, Dendermonde adds up to this. Sufficient to keep trade in Antwerp low and control of the 
Scheldt high. On the other hand, the joint supervision of Ghent and an interdiction to modify 
customs and excises will render it easy for (mainly Dutch) exports to inundate the markets. 
Possession of Ostend and Bruges seems thus a reasonable concession, and allows Britain to 
balance the Dutch in the region. Consequently, tariffs will have to stand at the same rate and will 
be equally applicable to both nations’ commerce60. Rejecting this scheme would be an act of folly. 
Next to the fact that considerations of trade with the southern neighbours should only come 
second to those concerning ‘peace & safety, as well as the wealth & power of the States’, the 
States-General should consider ‘the cast summs the preservation of those countrys has cost them & 
the miserable condition they are in with regard to their barrier there’ (the latter being dependent 
on the Emperor’s execution of the 1715 Barrier Treaty)61. 
Although the political arguments are sound, Walpole (who occupied the post in The Hague for 
several years) doubts they will be of sufficient priority to lure the States General into agreeing. 
As long as the Dutch Republic does not want to give up the barrier (the maintenance of which is 
theoretically possible, since the system –merely lodging troops in foreign fortresses- does not 
imply a transfer of sovereignty), it will not agree to British military control of anything else than 
Ostend (where the Imperial Trading Company is a nuisance to Dutch commerce). Moreover, 
there is few certainty to be attached to Townshend’s affirmation of a long-term British 
occupation. The Dunkirk garrison, established in 1658, was already given up in 1662, with the 
city sold to Louis XIV62. A change in administration could let the house of cards collapse. 
E. EXPLAINING THE MOVE TO PARLIAMENT 
As to internal British objections, Townshend sees Flanders as a second Ireland: strategically 
vital, so a heaven for troops without the slightest need for specific approbation. Moreover, the 
case of the Dunkirk garrison63 supported the continuous geostrategic attention Britain ought to 
devote to Flanders. Walpole, on the contrary, is extremely skeptical. Raising even eight to ten 
thousand men will cause political problems in Britain, which were already present during the 
War of the Spanish Succession, where the military threat was evident. Without a major incident, 
this costly move will not be paid for.  
IV. ‘BRING THIS MAD WOMAN TO REASON’: THE AUSTRIAN NETHERLANDS IN EUROPE 
A. AMBITIOUS ELISABETH 
According to William Stanhope (1690-175664)’s latest dispatch, to which Townshend explicitly 
refers, Philip V’s temper is such, that the Spanish monarch is determined to come to a rupture 
with Britain over the question of Gibraltar65. Although George I assured Philip of his good will 
concerning the restitution of the rock at the time of the Quadruple Alliance (1718), this promise 
was barely enforceable. Philip V had been deceived, since parliamentary approval in the 
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Commons was a legal condition sine qua non to any territorial alienation or cession to a third 
party. The fact that George came back on his earlier promise, infuriated Queen Elisabeth Farnese 
(1692-1766), who dramatically produced the said letter before ambassador Stanhope’s eyes. 
Townshend interprets this as a symbolic act, serving communicative purposes, and does not 
doubt that Spain was aware of the nature of George’s engagement. The Secretary of State links 
Spanish hostility to Viennese intrigues.  
Gibraltar was far from the predominant bilateral issue between Madrid and London. Britain 
went to war in 1701 because of commercial interest in the American territories and obtained a 
permission vessel, as well as the exclusive black slave contract (Asiento de Negros66) at the Peace 
of Utrecht in 1713. A suspension of peaceful relations thus amounted to a suspension of 
commercial relations as well, at a moment where Spain was according a comparable trade 
permission to the Imperial Ostend East India Company. In other words, Britain’s prime national 
interest, maritime dominance, was at risk67. At the same time, the structural condition for 
maintaining the latter situation consisted in a territorial balance in Europe. Allowing Vienna 
access to the Spanish overseas commercial potential was a threat in the long run68. 
B. HAUGHTY EMPEROR 
By contrast, it was far from realistic from the Habsburg point of view to challenge British 
commerce at unfavorable odds. Townshend suspects the Ripperda Treaty-tandem to exert 
pressure on Parliament: if Britain accepts Maria Theresia’s succession and abandons her 
support for France, the urge to return Gibraltar to Spain could suddenly weaken considerably69. 
In this game, his judgment of Queen Elisabeth is particularly severe: 
 
having thrown herself entirely into the hands of the Imp[eria]l court, & having such an ascendant 
over the King of Spain, and being so charmed with the prospects of Grandeur for her son, which the 
Emp[ero]r has displayd to her in such a light, as to make her forget her Husband’s interest, Spain & 
the Spaniards. We may with great probability conclude that all our force used against Spain only & 
its dominions, even though it should go to the depriving them of their possessions in the E[ast] & 
W[est] Indies, would not bring this mad woman to reason70. 
 
Townshend sees the resolution of this enigma in a concentration of efforts on Vienna:  
 
by well concerted alliances so to terrify the Emp[ero]r, as that he may think it for his own interest to 
abandon the ambitious projects he is now forming & consequently make it his business to appease 
and pacify this wild Queen. 
 
In other words, Spain is a freely rolling reversed pawn on the chessboard, willing to go in the 
direction indicated by the predominant player of the moment. Once brought out of control by 
Britain’s main challenger, the Emperor, it will realize its relatively weak position. 
However, Townshend sees Britain isolated in September 1725. The ‘haughtly & ambitious71’ 
Charles VI will need serious arguments to change his mind. Consequently, Britain will have to 
mount the coalition on its own, in view of ‘the weakness of the people in whose hands the 
Government of France is at present’. 
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The only way in which to make the Emperor realize the seriousness of the British threat, is to 
solve the problem of the Southern Netherlands. Because of recent history (1667-1672-1688-
1701), it is very unlikely to Vienna that ‘England or Holland can [n]ever joyn heartily with France 
in a War against His Imp[eria]l Ma[jest]y, lest by that means we should give that crown an 
opportunity of getting possession of the Low Countrys, which the Court of Vienna thinks (& with 
reason) We can never submit to’. 
 Townshend gives this element even more importance:  
 
The firm persuasion they [the Court of Vienna] are in as to the truth of this particular was the main 
inducement H[is] Imp[eria]L  Ma[jes]ty had for entering into this scheme for marrying his daughter 
to D. Carlos (which may be so fatal to [f. 107r.] the libertys of Europe) & has even been the sole 
foundation of all the ungratefull, dishonourable & even barbarous treatment his Ma[jes]ty both as 
King & Elector, the British nation & Holland have received from him. 
 
Consequently, Britain needs to frighten off the Emperor with  
 
(1) a Scheme or concert formed (2) among powers able to put it in execution, by which, (3) in case 
they think fit to provoke us, the Netherlands may be taken out of their hands, & so disposed of, as 
that England & Holland may not only find no inconvenience (4) but even security & advantage from 
such a disposition.  
 
The litteral use of ‘frighten’ is in no ways insignificant: Townshend’s reasoning goes in realist 
and harsh terms: the material building up of absolute force needs to scare away the 
counterpart72.  
C. ‘GALLIA AMICA ET VICINA’ ? FRANCE IN THE PARTITION PLAN 
Townshend has little faith in the Duke of Bourbon’s government (1723-1726). The Duke, a 
sibling of the Bourbon-Condé-branch of the French Royal family, occupied the post of Prime 
Minister as a consequence of the Regent’s decease73. Although Louis XV (°1710) had reached 
legal majority since 1723, he left the business of government into the hands of others and kept 
only his preceptor Fleury as a confident. One of the Duke’s major policy decisions, the sending 
back of Philip of Spain’s daughter María Anna Victoria, Louis’ fiancée, was the immediate pretext 
for the conclusion of the Ripperda Treaty. The young King had had a chocolate indigestion, 
caused by diablotin-bonbons74, prior to the dismissal of the Infanta. Fears for his life pushed to 
the decision to expulse the princess, who was still minor and could thus not produce an heir to 
the throne in case of urgency. Bourbon found Louis another spouse with the Polish princess 
Maria Leczynska. He gradually lost power to the intriguing Cardinal Fleury, the King’s former 
praeceptor75.  
Consequently, this unstable situation did not inspire Townshend any confidence. ‘They are 
terribly afraid of anything that looks like engaging in a War’. Nevertheless, the scheme is not 
envisaged as an actual war plan, but as a means of pressure on the Imperial court, to relieve the 
pressure on Philip V and Elisabeth Farnese. If explained correctly –and who could better do this 
than Horace Walpole, ambassador in Paris ?– the weak French court might go ahead with the 
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plan. Here lies the reason why Jean-Baptiste Fleuriau de Morville (1686-1732), French Secretary 
for Foreign Affairs76, should not be informed of its content under any circumstance. 
However, the whole barrier system was set up in order to prevent France from gaining control 
of the Southern Netherlands. Could the historical aggressor in Versailles be reasonably expected 
to enter into a deal with Britain and Holland, likely to tie his hands in the long run ? Townshend 
makes a parallel reasoning with the Dutch case. Both states have had an evolving relationship 
during the 17th century, from natural allies against Spain (1635) to aggressor versus  Protestant 
spider in an anti-French web (1672-1715). On a continuum between 1635 and 1715, both states’ 
position seems to be closer to the latter than to the former. 
Horace Walpole’s main objection lies with the vagueness of the territorial division. If everything 
North of a line stretching from Ghent to Maastricht were given to the Dutch Republic77, what was 
to become of the remaining cities (Namur, Luxemburg, Mons, Menin, Courtray) and their 
provinces ? If France were to obtain a free hand in the Southern Netherlands, it would not be 
impossible to witness another time the mechanism of the 1668 Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, 
whereby France obtained “corridors” in the Southern Netherlands78. Both impossible to defend 
and a tempting motive to attack the interlocked territories of the others, they formed the main 
reason for the constitution of Vauban’s pré carré.  
The alternative to a broad but expensive and ineffective barrier of a minimal Dutch occupation 
not going further than the Demer, would have the disadvantage of giving France a free run at the 
rest. Townshend’s partition plan would thus be enthusiastically received at the French court, 
putting an end to the Dutch credo of Gallia Amica, Sed Non Vicina79. Moreover, if the balancing of 
France were executed in a way as to install a plethora of independent princes around the French 
corridor, it would be all too easy, once France has regained its military strength, to annex the 
principalities one after the other80. 
CONCLUSION: DIPLOMACY, IDEATIONAL POWER AND THE TRENTE HEUREUSES 
 
En cas de rupture avec l'Empereur, il n'y avait pas d'autre moyen pour le ramener à l'exécution des 
traités que d'agir dans les Pays-Bas, en assurant bien d'ailleurs, pour ne point laisser naître de 
défiance des desseins du Roy, que S.M. ne veut ni conquêtes, ni agrandissements, ni du côté des 
Pays-Bas, ni d'autre côté. 
Instructions for French Ambassador Broglie, 172581 
 
The Utrecht solution seemed to have finally imposed a lasting regime on the Southern 
Netherlands. In the hands of a faraway monarch in Vienna, the territory could not be used to 
threaten one of the prominent neighbours. However, this could only be valid in a hypothesis 
where relations between the Emperor and the Maritime Powers remained cordial. Nothing 
prevented the Emperor from using the Southern Netherlands as a subsidiary trump card in the 
European game. Although it was unlikely anything would fundamentally alter their status as a de 
facto neutralized zone, they could offer a valuable bargaining chip. The swing in British 
diplomacy after 171682 would almost inevitably lead to frictions where the question would come 
forward again.  
The case of the Ostend Company and the Ripperda Treaty offered the potential to rethink British 
strategy. An inventive and assertive politician as Charles Townshend offered a supplementary 
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hypothesis amidst the ever-recurring standard solutions83. Neither a republic of independent 
cantons (as dreamt of by Richelieu or proposed during the War of the Spanish Succession), nor a 
French annexation, or administration by a third party (as envisaged by the French for Elector 
Max Emmanuel of Bavaria during the War of the Spanish Succession84), but the installation of a 
sui generis regime. Not between the mere Maritime Powers, but between them, France, and a 
possible fourth player. The Emperor’s behaviour had made it clear that no good was to be 
expected from an independent sovereign, who could combine his alliances into constellations 
alien to the British interest. 
Towsnhend’s solution recalls the Anglo-Dutch condominium (1706-1715). However, instead of 
cooperation with the local elites, the impetuous secretary of state chose a radical option: direct 
British sovereignty on the continent over Ostend. Consequently, at home, this would bring him 
in collision with Robert Walpole’s prudent non-interventionist maxim, allowing him to keep 
taxes low and Whig-electoral scores high. Almost fifteen years earlier, Britain quit the War of the 
Spanish Succession mainly out of country discontent with the heavy land tax85.  
Nevertheless, the lack of success of such a solution should not occult Townshend’s imaginative 
scheme. He leant himself to the key diplomatic exercise: translating political preferences into a 
generally acceptable terms.  Or, to gain horizontal and actor-constructed legitimacy for one’s 
actions, which is situated on a procedural (consent-based), as well as ideational (conceptual) 
level86. Thus, in order for his plan to succeed, he needed to put it within the continuity of treaties 
and international relations since the Peace of Utrecht. Partitioning the Southern Netherlands 
required French and Dutch approval, but foremost rhetorical conformity with the overarching 
balance-principle grounded in the treaties. 
Townshend’s letter also sheds light on a historical interpretative problem. The enormous body 
of diplomatic Franco-British correspondence between the wars of the Spanish and the Austrian 
Succession is to be seen on a continuum between transformative cooperation and the pursuance 
of traditional national interest. In view of the pervasiveness of equilibrium-discourse and the 
common interests, it is misleading to overemphasize the “breakdown” of alliances between 1727 
and 173187. Before the Europeanisation of the War of the Austrian Succession (1743), turning 
points were virtually inexistent. 
As the 1733 Neutrality Convention on the Barrier in the Southern Netherlands (France/Dutch 
Republic) illustrates, the Franco-British dyad was not conditioned by short term politics, but by 
long-term trends. On the basis of the (second) 1731 Treaty of Vienna, Britain was technically 
obliged to come to the rescue of Emperor Charles VI during the War of the Polish Succession 
(1733-173888). In order to avoid opposition, Cardinal Fleury offered the Dutch Republic 
beforehand to keep the terrain out of the war, knowing that Britain would then remain aloof. 
With success, since Britain only offered its mediation and no military help to Vienna. 
Consequently, the defeated Charles VI had to acquiesce to the start of bilateral negotiations 
between Fleury and Sinzendorf, leading to preliminaries in 1735 and finally to the (third) Treaty 
of Vienna (1738). 
Even at the height of international tension between their sovereign and their most recent 
invader, the Southern Netherlands remained sheltered behind the Utrecht agreement. Their 
position is therefore the perfect illustration of continuity in Franco-British relations, or, 
structural British aversion for the court of Vienna’s foreign policy. The resignation of the 
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polarizing Townshend  (1674-1738) in 1730 did not alter this. Moreover, the Whig ministry 
clung again to French friendship after the struggle over the Polish Succession89. As James 
Waldegrave (1684-1741), Walpole’s successor as ambassador in Paris, stated in the middle of 
the war:  
None can deny how much, ever since Europe was unhinged in the beginning of this century, Great 
Britain has toiled, how great treasures consumed to form an equilibrium in Europe, and settle a 
general peace. This end would have been atteind to, had the court of Vienna concurred with the 
same zeal and sincerity; but ill fortune will have it so, that his britannick majesty must feel the 
sorrow of seeing, that his great work has been destroyed by the conduct of the Vienna ministry, 
who, above all others, ought to have studied most how to preserve it, for their own interest's sake90. 
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